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Tort law should begin with a premise of responsibility rather than
rights, of interconnectedness rather than separation, and a priority
of safety rather than profit or efficiency.  The masculine voice of
rights, autonomy, and abstraction has led to a standard that
protects efficiency and profit; the feminine voice can design a tort
system that encourages behavior that is caring about others’ safety
and responsive to others’ needs or hurts, and that attends to
human contexts and consequences.1
INTRODUCTION:  ASKING THE WOMAN QUESTION OF THE RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS
Before the tort reform movement swept through the American
political agenda, if a medical product harmed a consumer, recourse
would likely come through a tort claim against the drug
manufacturer under the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  In most
instances, this consumer could establish liability by proving either
that the manufacturer lacked due care in designing the drug under a
                                                 
1. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 31-32
(1988).
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negligence theory,2 or that the product was in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous under the theory of strict liability.3
Therefore, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A,4 a
consumer could find protection in a tort system more concerned with
“caring about others’ safety” and being “responsive to others’ needs
or hurts”5 than insulating corporations from liability.
A “questionable” breed of tort law has emerged, however, focusing
more on addressing corporate “needs” and “hurts” than considering
those of the consumer.  In 1997, the American Law Institute
approved the Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability.6  One of
                                                 
2. Negligence design theory relates to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s decisions
concerning product design.  See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 62 (3d
ed. 1996) (noting that injuries resulting from design defects “are sometimes traceable to the
manufacturer’s failure to exercise reasonable care in designing the product”).
3. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990) (defining strict liability as “liability
without fault”) (citing Goodwin v. Reilley, 176 Cal. App. 3d 86, 90 (1985)).  Black’s Law
Dictionary continues its definition as follows:
A concept applied by the courts in product liability cases in which seller is liable for
any and all defective or hazardous products which unduly threaten a consumer’s
personal safety.  This doctrine imposes strict liability on one who sells a product in
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to user or consumer for harm caused to
ultimate user or consumer if seller is engaged in business of selling such product, and
product is expected to and does reach user or consumer without substantial change in
condition in which it is sold.
Id. (citing Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682, 688 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)).  The first
case to adopt strict liability was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products. Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)
(en banc), essentially removing the requirement of privity for establishing defect, thus
transferring liability from contract law to tort law.  See David Owen, Products Liability Law
Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 276-78 (1998) (noting that Greenman was decided at the time the
American Law Institute was revising the Restatement of Torts, therefore resulting in the
incorporation of strict liability into the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY OF PERSONS SUPPLYING CHATTELS FOR
THE USE OF OTHERS:  STRICT LIABILITY § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].  In
his famous article discussing strict liability and section 402A, Dean William L. Prosser, Reporter
of the Restatement (Second), explains that strict liability is grounded in notions of fairness and
consumer protection.  Dean Prosser quotes Justice Traynor’s opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944):
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences.  The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business.  It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public.  If such products nevertheless find
their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not
negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the
market.  However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly
they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one.
Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the
manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1120 (1960) (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 441).
5. Bender, supra note 1, at 32.
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter
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the most controversial aspects of this new Restatement is section 6(c).
Section 6(c) governs design defect liability for medical products.7  To
establish liability under section 6(c), a consumer must prove not only
that a medical product caused her harm, but also that a reasonable
health care provider would not have prescribed the product for any
class of patients.8  In other words, if every user suffered harm, and no
one derived benefit from a medical product, only then could a victim
bring a successful claim for design defect.9  This new standard
reduces company liability and responsibility and increases both
corporate profits and public harm.
Section 6(c) will disproportionately affect women for two reasons:
                                                 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
7. There have been numerous articles written opposing the strict standard of the
Restatement (Third), section 6(c).  See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design
Liability for Prescription Drugs:  The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 110 (1994) (contending the new design liability standard for medical
products is unconvincing and advocating the adoption of a negligence standard for medical
product design defect claims); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Impact of the New Products Liability
Restatement on Prescription Products, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 408 (1995) (“Not only does . . .
[section 6(c)] increase the . . . evidentiary burdens for plaintiffs who bring design claims
involving prescription products, it may pose initial problems of interpretation for the courts.”);
Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV.
1357, 1381 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Prescription Products] (arguing that the design liability
standard for medical products in the Restatement (Third) is “especially troubling” because it
creates a new approach to design defect claims for prescription products that “reject[s] the
usual risk-utility test that measures the overall risks and benefits of a product’s design and
compares them to alternative designs.  The proposed standard appears not to invite
comparisons with alternative products, and its narrow risk-utility test for sub-classes of product
users seems not only difficult to apply but effectively to eliminate design claims.”).  But see, e.g.,
James A. Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts:  A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471, 476 (1996) [hereinafter Henderson,
Reporter’s Perspective] (noting that the purpose of the law review article was to “explain and
defend the position taken in section [6(c)] of the Restatement (Third)”); James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Restatement Third, Torts:  Products Liability:  What Hath the ALI Wrought?, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 501,
516-18 (1997) [hereinafter Henderson, ALI Wrought?] (discussing the narrow standard of
liability for design defect claims for medical products); Andrew Barrett, Note, The Past and
Future of Comment K:  Section (4)(B)(4) of the Tentative Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts—Is It the
Beginning of a New Era of Prescription Drugs?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1291, 1322 (1995) (advocating
that the Restatement (Third)’s medical product design defect liability standard “best advances
public policy” because it allows prescription drugs to reach groups needing them most); Jeffrey
D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Is it Really What the
Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 692-93 (1997) (arguing that physicians are not the
appropriate people to judge pharmaceutical product design and as such, advocating that the
Restatement (Third) adopt a “reasonable manufacturer” rather than a “reasonable physician”
approach).
8. Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) states:
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective design if
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by [the] drug or medical device are sufficiently
great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health care
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, note 6, § 6(c).
9. See id. § 6(c) cmt. b (noting that under section 6(c) “a drug is defectively designed only
when it provides no net benefit to any class of patients”).
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(1) women consume a greater share of medical products than men; 10
and (2) the regulatory system has not adequately tested and
monitored products for women. 11  Section 6(c), however, is not the
Restatement (Third)’s only product design defect provision.  Section 2
establishes a separate standard of liability for general product design
defect apart from medical or prescription products.12  As compared to
Section 6, Section 2 provides an aggrieved consumer more
opportunity to establish design defect liability.  The Restatement
(Third)’s authors (the “Reporters”) acknowledge that the
requirements to establish design liability for general product defect
are less stringent than for medical products.13  Section 2 permits the
plaintiff to present a reasonable alternative design to establish a
design claim for general product defect, rather than requiring proof
that the product was ineffective for all users.14
In addition, section 2 provides for an exception to the liability
standard for general product design defect claims.15  Under the
comment e exception, if the product’s design renders its social utility
low in relation to its potential to cause harm, liability attaches
regardless of the existence of a reasonable alternative design.16  The
                                                 
10. See LESLIE LAURENCE & BETH WEINHOUSE, OUTRAGEOUS PRACTICES:  THE ALARMING
TRUTH ABOUT HOW MEDICINE MISTREATS WOMEN 295 (1994) (noting that “[w]omen take more
prescription drugs than men and buy more over-the-counter medications for themselves and
their families”); L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials:  The
Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 VAND. L. REV. 877, 878
(1992) (discussing the fact that women consume more prescription drugs than men and also
disproportionately suffer a greater number of side effects from these drugs).
Women’s greater use of medical products is further revealed through an analysis of the
nature of products liability suits involving women.  For example, one survey revealed that “of all
women winning punitive awards in any kind of trial, nearly 70% were injured by defective drugs
or medical devices.”  Linda Marsa, The Breast Implant Backlash, WORKING WOMAN, Apr. 1, 1996,
at 46, 76.
11. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the regulatory
system to test and monitor drugs for women).
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6(c) cmt. b (“Because of the special nature of
prescription drugs and medical devices, the determination of whether such products are not
reasonably safe is to be made under subsection [6](c) and (d) rather than under §§ 2(b) and
2(c).”).
13. See id. (“Subsection c [of section 6] imposes a more rigorous test for defect than does
2(b) which does not apply to prescription drugs and medical devices.”).
14. The Restatement (Third) provides for design defect liability for a general product defect
standard under section 2(b):
A Product:
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe.
Id. § 2(b).
15. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the comment e exception).
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b).
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rationale behind comment e is that rigid liability standards should
not apply to products with low social utility.17  Section 6(c), however,
does not provide any such exception for medical product design
defect claims.
The importance of comment e’s general product defect exception
is realized when one views the new theories of liability through the
eyes of the aggrieved female consumer.  Analyzing the Restatement
(Third) from a gender perspective reveals its potential to minimize the
obstacles women face when asserting medical product design defect
claims.  This Comment’s approach to analyzing the Restatement (Third)
is not unlike that taken by scholars who examine the law in gendered
terms.  For example, the “Woman Question” is one method of
inquiry “designed to identify the gender implications of rules and
practices which might otherwise appear to be neutral or objective.”18
Many scholars have asked the Woman Question as it relates to tort
law.19
In keeping with this body of thought, this Comment poses the
Woman Question to the Restatement (Third).  The response is
troubling as this inquiry reveals that section 6(c)’s liability standard
for medical product defect claims will disproportionately harm
women.
Unsettled by the Restatement (Third)’s response to the Woman
Question, this Comment offers a more favorable answer:  Comment
e.  That is, the tort system should recognize an exception for
“manifestly unreasonably designed” medical products failing to meet
the difficult standard of section 6(c).
By extending comment e to section 6(c), the tort system would
embrace the idea that women’s safety demands a more reasonable
standard of liability for medical product defect claims.  Absent such
an exception, women will continue to suffer harm at the hands of the
tort system as companies lack incentive to design safer products and
to recall harmful products from the market.20  Furthermore, products
                                                 
17. See id.
18. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990)
(defining the application of the Woman Question to the law as an examination of “how the law
fails to take into account the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of
men . . . or how existing legal standards and concepts might disadvantage women”).  In
addition to analyzing the gender impact of various provisions of law, the Woman Question
proposes possible solutions to remedy disparities.  See id.  (“The Woman Question asks about
the gender implications of a social practice or rule:  [H]ave women been left out of
consideration?  If so, in what way; how might that omission be corrected?”).
19. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the works of feminist tort scholars and the application
of their theories to an analysis of section 6(c)).
20. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that the threat of
liability has on a manufacturer’s motivations to redesign and recall harmful medical products).
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genuinely helpful to a subset of users will remain on the market, as
comment e’s risk-benefit test will factor in the critical need for the
product when determining whether to impose liability.
Part I of this Comment provides background on the relevant
provisions of the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third).  With
regard to the Restatement (Second), Part I addresses the theories behind
strict liability, unavoidably unsafe products, and the res ipsa loquitur
standard.  With regard to the Restatement (Third), Part I discusses
general product design defect, “circumstantial evidence supporting
the inference of product defect” (res ipsa loquitur), the concept of
manifestly unreasonable design, and the design defect standard for
medical products.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the case law offered in support of
the section 6(c) standard in the Restatement (Third).  This Part focuses
on two primary issues.  First, Part II argues that the one case cited by
the Reporters of the Restatement (Third) for direct support of section
6(c) creates a “super” res ipsa loquitur standard like that in section 3
of the Restatement (Third).  Additionally, the two cases relied upon by
the Reporters for supplemental support for section 6(c) fail to reflect
the section 6(c) standard.  Second, Part II analyzes the feminist
application of tort law by asking the Woman Question and focusing
on the relationship between women and medical products.  Part II
argues that the special classification of medical products apart from
other products in the Restatement (Third) is a tenuous distinction, that
the regulatory system has many general flaws which prevent it from
adequately monitoring and testing medical products, and that
women’s exclusion from drug testing renders the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) unable to regulate harmful products for
women.
Part III advocates the adoption of the comment e exception for
general product design defects in section 2 to the liability standard
under section 6(c) for medical product design defects.  Part III
determines that although the Reporters did not intend comment e to
apply to section 6(c), case law, the prior application of comment k of
the Restatement (Second), and the theory behind the comment e
exception suggest that comment e should apply to section 6(c).
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I. BACKGROUND:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF TORT LAW:  FROM THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TO THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
A. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
The American Law Institute adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in 1963.  Since that time, the theory of strict liability in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) has governed products liability
doctrine in most states.21  The Restatement (Second) serves as a basis to
compare the changes in products liability law encompassed in the
Restatement (Third) which adversely affect female consumers of
medical products.  First, the Reporters of the Restatement (Third)
eliminated strict liability from both medical and general product
defect claims.22  Second, comment k of the Restatement (Second)
establishes immunity from strict liability for drug manufacturers.23
Most jurisdictions, however, have historically exempted
manufacturers from strict liability only after conducting an
individualized review to determine whether a medical product
constituted an “unavoidably unsafe product.”24  The Restatement
(Third), however, precludes a case-by-case application of a design
defect liability standard.  Finally, section 328D of the Restatement
(Second) (res ipsa loquitur) provides for liability based on
circumstantial evidence of negligence as indicated by the defendant’s
relationship to events.25  This section of the Restatement (Second)
                                                 
21. After the American Law Institute approved the Restatement (Second) in 1963, most states
quickly adopted section 402A or some form of strict liability:
[T]he general adoption of the doctrine [of strict liability] in this country from 1963 to
the mid-1970s is one of the most rapid and dramatic doctrinal developments to occur
in the law of torts.  As of 1996, all states except Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan,
North Carolina and Virginia had adopted strict products liability in tort.
OWEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 165.
22. See  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra  note 6, § 6 reporters’ note, cmt. f (“As with § 2, the
test in § 6 is stated in functional terms.  Thus whether the case is brought under negligence or
strict liability, a plaintiff would be successful only if it could make out the elements as set forth
in § 6(c).”).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k (recognizing that
manufacturers/sellers of certain products, such as prescription drugs which have fully justified
risks given their intended purpose, should not be subject to strict liability).
24. See Barrett, supra note 7 (noting that the individualized risk-benefit analysis is the
predominant application of comment k); see also Jeffrey Nolan Diamant, Comment, Texas Senate
Bill 4:  Product Liability Legislation Analyzed, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 921, 949 (1994) (indicating that
while some courts interpret comment k as giving total immunity to manufacturers from design
defect suits relating to approved medical products, other jurisdictions use a case-by-case
approach to assess whether medical products fall within the comment k exemption).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 328D cmt. b.
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strongly resembles section 3 of the Restatement (Third).26  Section 3
serves as a basis to reveal the overly stringent nature of the medical
product design defect standard in the Restatement (Third), section
6(c).
1. Section 402A:  strict liability
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) established strict liability in
tort law and has served as the basis of thousands of products liability
decisions.27  As embodied in section 402A, strict liability imposes
liability without requiring a showing of negligence on the part of the
product seller or manufacturer.28  Strict liability concerns the nature
of the product (i.e., whether the product is defective), whereas
negligence focuses on the manufacturer’s actions (i.e., whether the
manufacturer designed the product negligently).29  In applying strict
liability to design defect claims, courts will find a manufacturer liable
for the defective design of a drug regardless of whether negligence
exists.  The rationale behind strict liability is that the manufacturer,
in a better position than the consumer to assume loss associated with
a defective product, should bear the responsibility for harm caused by
the product.30  The Restatement (Third), however, eliminates strict
                                                 
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 3 cmt. a (noting that section 3 traces its
origins to section 328D of the Restatement (Second)).
27. See generally John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes:  The American Law Institute Adorns
“New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects–A Survey of the States Reveals a Different
Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493 (1996) (providing a survey of the 50 states’ application of section
402A to product liability cases).
Restatement (Third) Reporters, Professors James A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski
characterize section 402A of the Restatement (Second) as a “holy writ” because of its pervasive
influence on products liability cases.  See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1992).
28. Section 402A imposes liability in the absence of negligence:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling  such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A.
29. See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don’t Say I Didn’t Warn You (Even Though I Didn’t):  Why the
Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1125, 1133 (1994) (analyzing
the difference between a negligence and strict liability inquiry).
30. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 1120; see also Hager, supra note 29, at 1132-33 (noting that
the purpose of strict liability includes “facilitating victim compensation, corrective justice,
supplier wealth relative to victim’s wealth, incentives for safe products, social loss-spreading
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liability for design defect claims.31
2. Comment k:  unavoidably unsafe products
The Restatement (Second) includes comment k as an exception to
section 402A’s strict liability provision.32  Comment k recognizes that
some products are “quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use.”33  Comment k states that if a
manufacturer properly markets a drug and provides for adequate
warnings, strict liability does not attach.34  The rationale behind
comment k is that a manufacturer should escape strict liability for
developing drugs and other conceivably dangerous, yet socially
beneficial, products.35
Courts, however, have applied the comment k exception primarily
on a case-by-case basis.36  Most courts engage in a risk-benefit analysis
to determine whether to exempt the manufacturer from strict liability
under comment k.37  The Restatement (Third) Reporters, however,
                                                 
through insurance and price mechanisms, and efficiency in reducing costs of both accidents
and accident prevention”) (citations omitted).
31. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A cmt. k.
33. Id.
34. Comment k of section 402A reads, in part, as follows:
[Unavoidably unsafe products] are especially common in the field of drugs.  An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree
of risk they involve.  Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. See id.
36. The predominant application of comment k is an individualized analysis to determine
if the product’s risks outweigh its benefits.  See Barrett, supra note 7, at 1314 (“[T]o date the
‘risk-benefit’ analysis is predominant in the application of comment k.”); see also Diamant, supra
note 24, at 949 (recognizing how jurisdictions apply a case-by-case approach to see whether
products are unavoidably unsafe and therefore, shielded from liability under comment k).
37. There have been a number of reasons suggested to explain why most state courts have
failed to extend comment k immunity to all medical products.  The first is the confusing nature
of comment k.  See Winchester, supra note 7, at 657 (noting that Professor Aaron D. Twerski, the
senior Reporter of the Restatement (Third), offers an “A” in his course to any student who can
explain comment k to him, and Professor Twerski has yet to award an “A” for a student’s
comment k explanation) (citing Aaron D. Twerski, From a Reporter’s Perspective:  A Proposed
Agenda, 10 TOURO L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1993)).  Second, application of comment k usurps a court’s
discretionary power.  See id. at 658 (“Given the seriousness and scope of real and potential
injury posed by mass-marketed pharmaceuticals, courts wishing to provide relief for injured
individuals are likely to seek ways around comment k.”).  Finally, comment k immunity can
ultimately provide “patently unjust results” by protecting “products that should, by all accounts,
not be on the market.”  See id. (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988)).
There are, however, a minority of jurisdictions adhering to a pure application of comment k.
That is, these jurisdictions have determined that the overall social benefit of drug development
and availability outweighs the application of strict liability to drug manufacturers.  The
California case, Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988), exemplifies a pure comment k
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failed to incorporate this precedent of risk-benefit analysis into
section 6(c).38
3. Res ipsa loquitur:  liability without proof of defect
The Restatement (Second) includes section 328D, the res ipsa
loquitur39 standard of inferring negligence and causation.40  Section
328D establishes liability absent evidence of negligence.  This theory
is based on the concept that harm would not have occurred but for
the existence of negligence.41  Res ipsa loquitur originated with Byrne
v. Boadle,42 a case in which a flour barrel rolled from the defendant’s
warehouse window onto a passing pedestrian.43  Because the barrel
would not have fallen without negligence on the part of the
warehouse owner, the plaintiff was not required to establish the
defendant’s negligence.44  Under section 328D, if an event ordinarily
would not occur absent negligence, and the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of care, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that
he/she or other third parties were not responsible for the harm in
order to establish liability.45  This section of the Restatement (Second) is
the basis of section 3, “Circumstantial Evidence Supporting Inference
                                                 
application.  In Brown, the California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to
uphold a pretrial ruling dismissing the plaintiffs’ design claim against the manufacturer of
diethylstilbestrol (DES).  See id. at 487.  The plaintiffs claimed that the defective design of DES
harmed them in utero.  See id. at 473.  The Brown court concluded, in part, as follows:
[A] drug manufacturer’s liability for a defectively designed drug should not be
measured by the standards of strict liability . . . and because of the public interest in
the development, availability, and reasonable price of drugs, the appropriate test for
determining responsibility is the test stated in comment k.
Id. at 477; see also Winchester, supra note 7, at 653-54 (commenting that prior to Brown,
California did not follow a pure comment k application, but rather a case-by-case analysis using
a risk-benefit test).
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6 reporters’ note, cmt. f (indicating that
while certain courts have historically imposed judicial review for claims alleging defectively
designed medical products, the rule set forth in section 6(c) provides “the exclusive basis for a
cause of action based on objective drug design”).  Therefore, because section 6(c) fails to
incorporate a risk-benefit analysis into the liability standard for defectively designed medical
products, section 6(c) essentially lacks the element of individual assessment of a drug’s risks
and benefits before granting blanket immunity from liability to a drug manufacturer.
39. The term res ipsa loquitur translates as “the thing speaks for itself.”  See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 4, § 328D cmt. a.
40. See id.
41. See id. § 328D(1)(a) (“It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by
negligence of the defendant when . . . the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence . . . .”).
42. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 328D cmt. a (recognizing that the concept
of res ipsa loquitur is derived from the case of Byrne v. Boadle).
44. See Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 301 (stating that when a barrel falls from the window of a
warehouse while under the control of a defendant and then injures the plaintiff, there is prima
facie evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff is not required to show that the barrel could not
have fallen without negligence).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 328D(1)(a)-(c).
1150 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1139
of a Product Defect,” in the Restatement (Third).
B. The Restatement (Third) of Torts
Approved in 1997 by the American Law Institute, the Restatement
(Third) created new liability standards for claims alleging both
medical and general product design defect.  These changes in the
liability standards have generated controversy among members of the
American Law Institute and other torts commentators.46  The conflict
stems from the fact that the new standards for both general and
medical product defect are much stricter than in the Restatement
(Second).47  The following section discusses section 2(b), comment e,
and section 3 of the Restatement (Third), essential elements in the
analysis of section 6(c) and its effects on female consumers.
1. Section 2(b):  general product design defect liability
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) governs claims alleging
general product design defect.48  Section 2(b) eliminates strict
liability under the Restatement (Second), section 402A, and replaces it
with a stringent negligence standard.49  Under section 2(b), a plaintiff
establishes design defect liability by demonstrating that a reasonable
alternative product design exists.50  This standard is a marked
departure from section 402A’s strict liability standard.51  For example,
under the Restatement (Second), a plaintiff harmed by an exploding car
engine would establish design defect by proving either manufacturer
                                                 
46. See supra note 7 (discussing articles in support of, and in opposition to, the section 6(c)
standard for medical product design defect liability).  In addition, section 2(b), requiring proof
of a reasonable alternative design to establish general design defect liability, was controversial as
well.  See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective
Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 882-87 (1998) (arguing that the reasonable alternative
design provision in section 2(b) is the best standard for determining general product design
defect); Henderson, ALI Wrought?, supra note 7, at 507 (noting that aspects of section 2(b) are
likely “to take practitioners by surprise” because of a substantial departure in section 2(b) from
the consumer protection standards of section 402A in the Restatement (Second)); Alan J. Lazarus
et al., Recent Developments in Products, General Liability and Consumer Law, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 605,
606 (1998) (“More controversial is the ALI’s conclusion that, in most instances to prevail under
section 2(b), the plaintiff must introduce evidence of a reasonable alternative design that would
have prevented the injury in question and produced a net safety benefit as compared with the
existing design.”).
47. See supra note 46.
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b).
49. See id.; see also supra note 22 (noting that regardless of whether the plaintiff makes a
claim for negligence or strict liability, the requirements of 2(b) must be met to establish
liability).
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 402A (providing for liability for harm
caused by “any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer”).
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negligence in the engine design process or, under section 402A, that
the engine was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
regardless of manufacturer negligence.52  Under section 2(b),
however, the plaintiff must prove that a reasonable alternative engine
design exists.53
2. Comment e:  the exception to section 2(b)
The Restatement (Third) provides comment e as an exception to
section 2(b)’s demanding design defect liability standard.54  Invoking
comment e, a plaintiff claiming design defect is not required to
establish the existence of a reasonable alternative design.55  Rather,
the products undergo a risk-benefit test to determine whether their
potential harms outweigh their social utility.56  The rationale for
comment e is that liability should extend to include products whose
intended purpose is such that no alternative design would be
reasonable.57  To illustrate the comment e exception, the Restatement
(Third) presents the example of a toy gun that shoots rubber pellets.58
If the purpose of the toy gun is to cause harm with the rubber pellets,
a safer pellet design would defeat the purpose of the toy gun.59
Therefore, no alternative gun design exists.60  Comment e would
apply, absent a reasonable alternative design, if the court determined
that the gun was “manifestly unreasonably design[ed]” because its
purpose contained little social utility.61
Under section 6(c), there is no such exception for manifestly
unreasonably designed medical products.  Consumers of medical
                                                 
52. See id.
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b).
54. See id. § 2(b) cmt. e.
55. See id.
56. See id. (noting that a product is defective when its capacity for danger “substantially
outweighs” its social utility).
57. See id.  Comment e states that:
There might be cases in which the jury would be permitted to hold the defendant
liable on account of a dangerous design feature even though no safer design was
feasible.  If, for example, the danger was relatively severe and the product had only
limited utility, the court might properly conclude that the jury could find that a
reasonable manufacturer would not have introduced such a product into the stream of
commerce.
Id. (citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978)).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. A court may deem a product “manifestly” unreasonably designed because no
alternative design would render the product safe for society:  “[T]he realism of the hard-pellet
gun, and thus its capacity to cause injury, is sufficiently important to those who . . . use such
products to justify the court’s limiting consideration to toy guns that achieve realism by
shooting hard pellets . . . . ” Id.
61. See id.
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products are thus at a double disadvantage:  Not only is the standard
for medical product design defect claims more difficult under section
6(c), but this stringent liability standard is subject to no exception in
the Restatement (Third).  Further compounding the general inequity of
section 6(c) are the specific gender ramifications of such a stringent
standard of liability.  As greater consumers of medical products62 that
generally lack adequate testing and monitoring,63 women will be most
affected by the absence of an exception for medical product design
defect claims.
3. Section 3:  the res ipsa loquitur of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
One of the few concepts surviving the transition from the
Restatement (Second) to the Restatement (Third) is res ipsa loquitur.
Section 3 is the res ipsa loquitur standard found in the Restatement
(Second), section 328D.64  Section 3 provides for liability absent
evidence of a manufacturing or design defect when “a product fails to
perform its manifestly intended function, thus supporting the
conclusion that a defect of some kind is the most probable
explanation.”65  Examples of defect scenarios considered under
section 3 include a blender shattering and causing eye damage to the
user and a new car seat’s collapse and the car’s subsequent
propulsion into oncoming traffic.66  In both situations, these products
                                                 
62. See supra note 10.
63. See infra Parts II.B.2.b-c.
64. Section 328D of the Restatement (Second) serves as the basis of section 3 of the Restatement
(Third).  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 3 cmt. a (explaining that tort law permits the
inference of negligence to establish liability where that negligence is the “best explanation” for
the cause of the harm).
65. Id. § 3.  Section 3 of the Restatement (Third), “Circumstantial Evidence Supporting
Inference of a Product Defect,” states:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product
defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific defect,
when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of a product defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than product defect
existing at the time of sale or distribution.
Id.
Furthermore, the Reporters discuss the application of section 3 to both manufacturing and
design defects:  “Section 3 allows the trier of fact to draw the inference that the product was
defective whether due to a manufacturing defect or a design defect.”  Id. § 3 cmt. b.
66. The Reporters present the first illustration as follows:
John purchased a new electric blender.  John used the blender approximately 10 times
exclusively for making milkshakes.  While he was making a milkshake, the blender
suddenly shattered.  A piece of glass struck John’s eye, causing harm.  The incident
resulting in harm is of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect.
Id.
The Reporters present the second illustration as follows:
Mary purchased a new automobile.  She drove the car 1,000 miles without incident.
One day she stopped the car at a red light and leaned back to rest until the light
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failed to perform their intended functions and were therefore
defective, even absent proof of manufacturer negligence.67
The purpose of incorporating a discussion of section 3 into an
analysis of section 6(c) is to reveal the unreasonably stringent nature
of section 6(c).  As will be discussed, section 6(c) can be
characterized as a “super” res ipsa loquitur standard.
4. Section 6(c):  medical product design defect liability
a. Background
Section 6(c) is one of the most controversial sections in the
Restatement (Third).68  The section 6(c) standard governs design defect
liability for medical products.69  Section 2(b)’s general design defect
liability requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design to establish
liability is not applicable to medical products.70  Instead, the
Reporters created a more rigid standard for medical product design
defect claims, grounding liability in the plaintiff’s ability to establish
the product’s lack of utility for any group of users.71  The Reporters
acknowledge the stringency of section 6(c),72 but justify this standard
based on two general rationales:  (1) medical products are unique in
relation to other products;73 and (2) the regulatory system will
                                                 
changed.  Suddenly the seat collapsed backward, causing Mary to hit the accelerator
and the car to shoot out into oncoming traffic and collide with another car.  Mary
suffered harm in the ensuing collision.  As a result of the collision, Mary’s car was set
afire, destroying the seat assembly.  The incident resulting in the harm is of a kind that
ordinarily occurs as a result of a product defect.  Mary need not establish whether the
seat assembly contained a manufacturing defect or a design defect.
Id.
67. See id.
68. See supra note 7 (noting numerous articles both in support of and in opposition to the
stringent section 6(c) standard).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6(c) (“A . . . medical device is not reasonably
safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the . . . device are
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care
providers . . . would not prescribe the . . . device for any class of patients.”).
70. See id. § 6(c) cmt. b (“[T]he determination of whether  . . . [prescription drugs or
medical devices] are not reasonably safe is to be made under Subsections [6](c) and (d) rather
than under §§ 2(b) and 2(c).”).
71. See id. § 6(c) cmt. f (stating that “when a drug or device provides net benefits to no
class of patients, when reasonable, informed healthcare providers would not prescribe it to any
class of patients—then the design of the product is defective and the manufacturer should be
subject to liability for the harm caused”).
72. See Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 494 (“The test for drug design
liability in section [6(c)] is deliberately narrow.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6,
§ 6(c) cmt. f (discussing the Reporters’ recognition that few claims will succeed under the
standard of section 6(c):  “Given this very demanding objective standard, liability is likely to be
imposed only under unusual circumstances”).
73. The Reporters argue that “a prescription drug or medical device entails a unique set of
risks and benefits.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6 cmt. b.  Furthermore, the
Reporters contend that “[w]hat may be harmful to one patient may be beneficial to another.”
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perform comprehensive product screening and monitoring.74  As will
be discussed, these rationales fail to constitute adequate justifications
for the rigorous section 6(c) standard.
b. Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The Reporters based section 6(c) on one case,75 Tobin v. Astra
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.76  The plaintiff, pregnant with twins, took
ritodrine to control her pre-term labor.77  As a result of taking the
drug, she suffered an adverse reaction and ultimately was forced to
undergo a heart transplant.78  The plaintiff presented evidence that
ritodrine was ineffective in controlling pre-term labor for any class of
patients.79  Furthermore, evidence indicated that the FDA may not
have adequately tested ritodrine, or even approved the drug.80  The
jury returned a verdict upholding the plaintiff’s defective design
claims.81  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the verdict based on evidence
indicating that the drug was generally ineffective.82
                                                 
Id.
The Reporters applied the section 6(c) standard to the issue of breast implant
availability, discussing the existence of two different breast implant designs.  See Henderson,
Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 484.  The first design presented a greater risk of side effects
while offering a more aesthetically pleasing shape and feel.  See id.  The other design had a
lower risk of side effects but produced a less natural shape and feel.  See id.  The Reporters deem
as paternalistic those who advocate for the removal of the first breast implant design from the
market:
Finding the softer implant design defective prevents its use by those women for whom
it is the healthiest choice.  Moreover, a finding of defectiveness also deprives those
knowingly willing to run the health risks of the softer alternative for aesthetic benefits.
It is paternalistic in the extreme to conclude that a woman’s informed choice to incur
remote health risks for aesthetic reasons does not deserve to be respected.
Id. at 485.
74. The Reporters discuss the role of the regulatory system in relation to the section 6(c)
standard:
Courts have . . . recognized that the regulatory system governing prescription drugs is
a legitimate mechanism for setting the standards for drug design. . . .  This deference
also rests on . . . [the assumption] . . . that governmental regulatory agencies
adequately review new prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably
dangerous designs off the market.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6 cmt. b; see also Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra
note 7, at 491-92 (discussing the rigorous nature of the FDA approval process).
75. See Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 487 (acknowledging that the
Reporters derive direct support for section 6(c) from only one case); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 6, § 6 reporters’ notes, cmt. f (citing Tobin for the proposition that “some
jurisdictions have essentially adopted the approach taken in section 6(c)”).
76. 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
77. See id. at 532.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 540.
80. The Tobin court discussed the nature of the FDA drug approval process, which includes
the requirement that the drug undergo two controlled studies.  See id. at 539.  Evidence
suggested that one of the FDA studies on Ritodrine was faulty.  See id.
81. See id. at 540.
82. See id.
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The Reporters argue that Tobin advances the section 6(c) position
that a drug is not defectively designed unless it fails for all classes of
patients.83  The Reporters reason that a “netting out of costs and
benefits” of a drug for “different classes of patients” would be
inappropriate because “if a drug exists that is clearly the drug of
choice for one or more classes of patients, it should not be denied to
them simply because other patients who should not take the drug
do . . . and suffer harm.”84
II. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 6(C):  SEARCHING FOR THE ANSWER BY
ASKING THE QUESTION
A. Does the Case Law Support Section 6(c)?
1. Section 6(c):  a “super” res ipsa loquitur standard
Tobin is an anomalous case, failing to reflect the typical design
defect scenario adequately.  The holding in Tobin, therefore, is not an
appropriate rationale on which to base section 6(c).
The rarity of Tobin is twofold.  First, under most circumstances the
FDA will not grant approval to a completely ineffectual drug.85
Therefore, Tobin will not be applicable to the average medical
product design defect claim.  Second, the Tobin court discussed
evidence indicating that the FDA may not have approved Ritodrine.86
The fact that medical products require FDA approval before their
release onto the market87 further enhances Tobin’s atypicality as a
medical product design defect case.  Rarely will a drug enter the
market lacking basic FDA approval, as may have happened in Tobin.
Tobin, therefore, is not an appropriate case on which to base section
6(c).
One could argue that the Tobin/section 6(c) standard of product
                                                 
83. See Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 488 (“The [Tobin] opinion leaves
no doubt that defendant’s proof of the drug’s efficacy for any class of patients was weak and
inconclusive.”).
84. Id.
85. Professor Schwartz commented on the rare set of circumstances presented in Tobin:
[Tobin] uphold[s] a jury verdict on a design claim where the evidence showed that the
drug posed serious risks but, despite FDA approval, was not efficacious for any class of
patients.  Arguably, only cases like Tobin come within the scope of liability established
by section [6].  Obviously such a case is rare.  Seldom does an FDA-approved drug or
device prove to be totally worthless.
Schwartz, Prescription Products, supra note 7, at 1383-84.
86. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting that evidence in Tobin suggested that
one of the FDA studies on Rotodrine was faulty).
87. Drug companies seeking FDA approval for new drugs must produce a rigorously tested
prototype.  See Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 492.
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defect liability actually represents a demanding section 3, res ipsa
loquitur analysis.  Section 3 applies in situations where “a product
fails to perform its manifestly intended function, thus supporting the
conclusion that a defect of some kind is the most probable
explanation.”88  Stripped down, section 6(c) is exposed as a “super”
res ipsa loquitur standard.  Like a shattering blender or a collapsed
car seat,89 the issue facing the section 6(c) plaintiff is efficacy; the
drug failed to work as intended and caused harm.90  Couched in
section 3 language, the Tobin drug “fail[ed] to perform its manifestly
intended function.”91  In Tobin, the plaintiff did not demonstrate the
existence of either a specific defect or an alternative design, but
rather merely established the drug’s general failure.92
The essential difference between section 6(c) and section 3,
therefore, is the definition of failure.  Under section 6(c), a drug
“fail[s] to perform its manifestly intended function” if it fails for
everyone who uses the drug.93  In contrast, the definition of failure
under section 3 is more expansive.  The section 3 plaintiff is merely
required to prove the product’s failure in a specific instance.94  Thus,
section 6(c) is a “super” res ipsa loquitur standard, forcing the
plaintiff to shoulder the difficult burden of establishing comprehensive
product failure not just for her, but for every class of users. 95
                                                 
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 3, cmt. b.
89. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (presenting the illustrations in section 3 of res
ipsa loquitur-type scenarios where liability is established absent proof of negligence).
90. In Tobin, the plaintiff won her design defect claim by establishing that the drug at issue
failed to perform as intended.  See Tobin v. Astra Pharm., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 540 (6th Cir.
1993).
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 3 cmt. b.
92. The Tobin court concluded:
Plaintiff introduced evidence . . . that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would not
market Ritodrine if the evidence of its efficacy was inconclusive.  Plaintiff also
introduced sufficient evidence regarding the various clinical studies concerning the
efficacy of Ritodrine.  The jury found that Ritodrine, as manufactured and marketed
by Astra, was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to plaintiff.  We
find that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to conclude that a prudent
manufacturer knowing all the risks would not market Ritodrine.
Tobin, 993 F.2d at 540.
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6(c).
94. “Under section 3, [the] plaintiff need not establish a specific defect if the plaintiff
meets the requisites of section 3(a) and (b).”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 3
reporters’ note, cmt. b(1).
95. In addition, comment f of section 6 reveals the nature of section 6(c) as a “super” res
ipsa loquitur standard.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 6, § 6 cmt. f.  According to
comment f of section 6, the defendant technically bears the burden of proving a drug’s efficacy:
“A defendant prescription drug or device manufacturer defeats a plaintiff’s design claim by
establishing one or more contexts in which its product would be prescribed by reasonable,
informed health care providers.”  Id.  Therefore, to present a section 6(c) claim, the plaintiff
initially need only establish the drug’s failure in a single circumstance.  In this respect, section
6(c) adheres to a traditional res ipsa loquitur standard.  Section 6(c) deviates from section 3,
however, and transforms into a “super” res ipsa loquitur standard as the defendant can defeat
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2. The failure of supplemental case law to support section 6(c)
Although Tobin served as the primary basis for section 6(c), the
Reporters cited two cases, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath96 and
Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,97 as supplemental support.98  The
Reporters conclude that these courts assigned design defect liability
for medical products based on a determination of whether the drug
proved effective for any group of patients.99  These cases, however, fail
to advance section 6(c) and instead represent the use of a risk-benefit
test to impose design defect liability for medical products.
a. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath involved a suit against a drug
manufacturer by a consumer of an oral contraceptive.  The plaintiff
presented evidence that the extra thirty milligrams of estrogen in the
oral contraceptive caused her to develop kidney failure,100
necessitating a kidney transplant.101  In addition, the immunotherapy
medication administered in conjunction with the kidney transplant
caused the plaintiff to develop cervical dysplasia, a condition
                                                 
the section 6(c) claim by establishing the product’s benefit to a subgroup of users.  See id.
(“Subsection c reflects the judgment that as long as a given drug or device provides net benefits
for a class of patients, it should be available to them . . . .”).  Thus, the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden under section 6(c) to establish sweeping inefficacy:
The risk-benefit test of section [6(c)] is . . . unique in that it must be applied to
particular subclasses of product users.  This may create particularly difficult problems
of proof for the plaintiff, since she may have to establish that a product’s risk not only
outweigh its benefits generally, but also with respect to particular sub-classes of users.
However, the provision could be read to shift the burden of proof on the risk-utility
issue to the defendant, at least with respect to any subclasses of users.  Although this
reading of the provision helps the plaintiff somewhat, ultimately she must counter the
defendant’s proof as to the effects on particular classes of patients.  In the final
analysis the plaintiff faces an enormously difficult task in claiming that a prescription
product is defective in design.  Only the narrowest set of circumstances would seem to
warrant such a claim.
Schwartz, Prescription Products, supra note 7, at 1384-85.
96. 722 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1986), overruled on other grounds, Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842
P.2d 175 (Colo. 1992).
97. 686 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La.), aff’d, 864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. See Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 488-90 (noting that “Tobin is not
the only reported decision to support the position adopted in section [6](c)” and citing
Williams and Ortho Pharmaceutical as supplemental support for Section 6(c) in the Restatement
(Third)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6 (citing Williams and Ortho
Pharmaceutical as supplemental support for section 6(c)).  The Reporters cite additional case law
and scholarly articles in their discussion of section 6(c) in the comments and Reporters’ notes;
however, the Reporters rely on Ortho Pharmaceutical and Williams as the main source of
supplemental support for section 6(c).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6(c), reporters’ note; see also infra notes 105,
114 and accompanying text.
100. The plaintiff’s doctor prescribed the oral contraceptive, Ortho-Novum 1/80, after the
plaintiff experienced break-through bleeding while taking Ortho-Novum 1/50.  See Ortho
Pharm., 722 P.2d at 412.
101. See id. at 411.
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requiring the plaintiff to undergo a hysterectomy.102  The plaintiff
sued the contraceptive manufacturer for defective design under
negligence and strict liability theories.103  The Supreme Court of
Colorado held that a risk-benefit test was the proper standard to
determine design defect liability.104
The Reporters claim that the holding in Ortho Pharmaceutical
reflects section 6(c)’s liability standard.105  A close reading of Ortho
Pharmaceutical, however, reveals that the court applied a risk-benefit
test unlike the section 6(c) standard.  First, the court held that a risk-
benefit analysis was the proper test of design defect.106  The court held
that the benefits of an extra thirty milligrams of estrogen outweighed
the attendant risks of the higher estrogen content.107
Second, the court concluded that the jury must weigh the drug’s
risks and benefits before assessing liability.  The court did not base its
final judgment on the drug’s effect on one class of patients.108
Rather, the court applied four factors to determine defective
design.109  The court concluded that evidence was conflicting, and
that the jury ought to weigh the evidence and make a determination
                                                 
102. See id. at 411-12.  Cervical dysplasia is a condition in which a woman has a high risk of
cervical cancer.  The plaintiff, therefore, elected to have a hysterectomy.  See id.  The plaintiff’s
doctors believed that the immunotherapy medication required to prevent kidney rejection
following transplant was responsible for the cervical dysplasia.  See id.
103. See id. at 412.
104. See id. at 415 (“The failure of the trial court to give an instruction on the risk-benefit
test was reversible error.”).
105. In the Reporters’ notes to section 6(c), the Reporters determine:  “[T]he Supreme
Court of Colorado revealed unambiguously [in Ortho Pharmaceutical] that the drug should be
found non-defective if the jury concluded that the drug was the drug of choice for at least one
class of patients.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6, reporters’ note.
106. The court discussed two types of jury instructions used in design defect cases:  a
consumer expectation test and a risk-utility test.  See Ortho Pharm., 722 P.2d at 413.  The court
defined the risk-utility test:  “[T]he plaintiff proves that the product’s design proximately
caused injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance
the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such a design.”
Id.  The Colorado Supreme Court determined that the lower court should have instructed the
jury under a risk-benefit analysis and not a consumer expectations test.  See id. at 415.
107. See id. at 414 (comparing the risk-benefit test to the consumer expectation test).
108. See id. at 415.
109. See id.  The court enumerated the factors used to determine if a product merits a
comment k instruction:  “[T]he product’s utility must greatly outweigh the risk created by its
use; the risk must be a known one; the product’s benefits must not be achievable in another
manner; and the risk must be unavoidable under the present state of knowledge.”  Id.  The
drug’s unique ability to remedy a certain condition was only one of four factors balanced by the
court in its determination whether to issue a comment k instruction.  See id. at 415-16 (applying
the four aforementioned factors to the case, with the fact that there was no alternative drug
available to treat break-through bleeding weighing equally among three other factors).
Furthermore, one of the Colorado Supreme Court’s recent statements on design defect
liability cited to Ortho Pharmaceutical, interpreting the decision as providing for a
“straightforward risk-benefit analysis.”  See Barton v. Adams Rental, 938 P.2d 532, 537 (Colo.
1997).
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of risk and benefit.110 The Reporters, however, overlooked the
weighing of factors in the case, concluding that Ortho Pharmaceutical
stood for the single proposition that a drug is not defective if it is “the
drug of choice for one class of patients.”111
b. Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.
Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. also involved a suit against a drug
manufacturer by an aggrieved consumer.  The issue concerned
whether a prescription drug for psychomotor seizures was designed
defectively after the plaintiff experienced an adverse drug reaction.112
The Williams court weighed the plaintiff’s severe drug reaction
against the medication’s overall benefits to determine that the drug
was not designed defectively.113  The Reporters argue that Williams
“emphas[izes] the drug’s efficacy for certain classes of patients,
notwithstanding its sometimes severely negative side effects,” thus
supporting section 6(c).114
The Reporters made a leap in linking section 6(c) to Williams.  The
Williams court utilized a risk-benefit test unlike any found in section
6(c).115  The court characterized defective design analysis as a
quantitative determination:  “[R]isk . . . concerns not only the
qualitative harmful effect, but also the quantitative harm or
‘incidence’ of serious adverse effects, that is, the ratio of instances of
harm compared to the total use or consumption of the product.”116
                                                 
110. See Ortho Pharm., 722 P.2d at 416.
111. In the Reporters’ note to section 6(c), Professors Henderson and Twerski write that in
Ortho Pharmaceutical:
[T]he record contained testimony which indicated that the increased risk of adverse
reactions occasioned by the extra thirty milligrams of estrogen outweighed any
benefits the product might produce.  The record also contained evidence that
[defendant’s drug] was the only available product for patients who experienced
breakthrough bleeding and therefore, produced benefits that outweighed any increased risk.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6, reporters’ note (quoting Ortho Pharm., 722 P.2d at
414) (emphasis added).  Upon citing this passage, the Reporters subsequently determine that
“[t]he emphasized language clearly indicates that if one class of patients is found to exist for
whom defendant’s drug is the one of choice, then it is not defective.”  Id.  The conclusion of the
passage of the Reporters states that the jury should weigh risks and benefits:  “Where there is
conflicting evidence, the question is properly submitted to the trier of fact.”  Id. (quoting Ortho
Pharm., 722 P.2d at 414).
112. The plaintiff was taking Tegretol and developed Stevens-Johnson Syndrome, a serious
adverse reaction known to occur from Tegretol.  See Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp.
573, 575 (W.D. La. 1988).
113. See id. at 578-79 (weighing the degree of quantitative risk evidence against the “value of
the high utility drug” to determine that the drug was not defectively designed).
114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6 reporters’ note, cmt. f; see also Henderson,
Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 488-89 (discussing the Reporters’ determination that
Williams supported the section 6(c) standard).
115. See Williams, 686 F. Supp. at 578-79 (discussing benefits and risks of Tegretol).
116. Id.  The court further discussed the importance of engaging in an overall assessment of
risk and benefit when determining whether a medical product is defectively designed:
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Therefore, to escape liability under Williams, a product’s overall
quantitative harm must be low.
The section 6(c) standard, however, is not a quantitative
assessment of harm.  Rather, if any subgroup exists for whom the
drug provides benefit, the product is not defectively designed despite
its overall incidence of harm.117  Under Williams, if the overall ratio of
harm to benefit is high, the drug is defectively designed.  The
Williams court emphasized that “the quantitative risk evidence . . . is
very scant” when determining whether the drug at issue was not
defectively designed.118  Therefore, the Williams decision fails to
support section 6(c), as the court engaged in a quantitative
assessment of risk and benefit.
The Reporters, despite being unable to boast substantial case law
support, created a stringent liability standard for medical product
design defect.  As acknowledged by the Reporters, rarely will a
plaintiff be able to establish a claim for medical product design
defect.119  Thus, given that harm will befall the consuming public,
which is impotent against drug manufacturers shrouded in the
Restatement (Third)’s corporate-friendly liability standards, the inquiry
becomes:  Who will most be harmed?  The answer is found by asking
the Woman Question.
B. What is the Relationship Between Women and Medical Products?
1. Feminist tort theory
Asking the Woman Question in the context of the Restatement
(Third) begins with an analysis of feminist tort theory.  Early feminist
legal theory focused on the struggle for “formal” constitutional
equality which segued into advocacy for the right to privacy (abortion
rights) and protection from domestic violence and sexual
harassment.120  Feminist legal theory encompasses varied aspects of
                                                 
“Although the danger may be devastating to those individuals who experience the worst effects
[of the drug], the incidence may be statistically small and the composite risk may not outweigh
the value of a high utility drug.”  Id.
117. “[A] prescription drug or medical device that has usefulness to any class of patients is
not defective in design even if it is harmful to other patients.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 6, § 6 reporters’ note, cmt. f.
118. See Williams, 686 F. Supp. at 579.
119. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting the Reporters’ declaration that they
purposefully designed section 6(c) to be a difficult standard of liability).
120. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 1504-
07 (1992) (tracing the effects of feminist legal theory in the legal system); see also Bartlett, supra
note 18, at 838-42 (discussing the historical application of the Woman Question in law
beginning with the efforts of Elizabeth Cady Stanton in the quest for suffrage, continuing
through the 1970s formal gender equality cases, and culminating in today’s changed legal
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women’s experiences and needs which bleed121 into different areas of
law and policy, including the realm of tort law.
“[T]ort suits define and signify basic social values about what
human activities are worthy of protecting . . . .”122  Runoff from
women’s social inequality has seeped into the tort system,123 as legal
scholars have established a body of thought regarding the tort
system’s disparate treatment of women.124  One of the most prevalent
examples derives from the discussion of tort reform and women.
As the cry for tort reform is currently sending Congress scrambling
to pass legislation limiting punitive damages125 and insulating
companies from liability,126 scholars are examining the reforms’
effects on women.  Men and women suffer different types of harms
under tort reform.127  According to one study, “mass torts affecting
                                                 
conception of a woman’s consent in rape cases).
121. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 120, at 1510 (using the term “bleeding” in a feminist
sense to discuss the interconnection of women’s issues in the law).
122. Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble:  The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L.
REV. 847, 849-50 (1997) (arguing that the societal devaluation of women is reflected in the tort
system).
123. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform:  Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995).  The authors note:
Social scientists have documented the ways that gender discrimination and sex role
socialization track women and men into separate, although overlapping, social and
occupational spheres . . . .  Many scholars argue that by not taking full account of the
manifold differences between males and females, law and the courts are deeply biased
against women.
Id.
124. Feminist tort scholarship has addressed such issues as punitive damage awards and
compensation for emotional injuries.  See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts
Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 577-79 (1993) (discussing the historical trend in tort law to
discount “emotional” injuries claimed more often by women); Finley, supra note 122, at 858-61
(addressing the tort system’s characterization of reproductive harm suffered by women as an
emotional harm ultimately resulting in smaller pecuniary damage awards); Koenig & Rustad,
supra note 123, at 3 (examining patterns of punitive damages and concluding that “awards are
subdivided into ‘his’ and ‘her’ tort worlds”).  Further issues identified by feminist legal scholars
include the gender implications of the reasonable person standard, loss of consortium,
wrongful life/wrongful birth cases, and duty to rescue.  See generally Bender, supra, at 581-82
(proposing the application of feminist legal theory to influence corporate practices and to
change laws controlling corporate forms, decision-making, and public access to corporate
records); see also Koenig & Rustad, supra note 123, at 9 (arguing that given the social inequality
of women, tort reforms that appear neutral can have “unanticipated negative impacts on
women”).
125. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 123, at 27 (characterizing the purpose of tort reform as
“to attack excessive jury awards, especially in the fields of products liability and medical
malpractice”).  The power of the tort reform movement is evidenced by the fact that 40 states
have either eliminated or curbed punitive damages.  See id. at 30-31.
126. For example, President William J. Clinton recently signed the Biomaterials Access
Assurance Act into law, a measure granting suppliers of raw materials and component parts of
medical implants immunity from liability for defectively designed products.  See Pub. L. No. 105-
230, 112 Stat. 1519 (1998) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606).
127. See Marsa, supra note 10, at 46.  Groups such as the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, the
Boston Women’s Health Collective, and trial lawyers argue that because women and men suffer
different product harms, limits on products liability damages will unfairly affect women and
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women feature injuries from defective products placed inside their
bodies, whereas men are seldom injured in this fashion.”128  These
injuries often manifest as reproductive129 and emotional harms,130 not
readily quantifiable in economic terms.131  These harms can, however,
directly influence the very tangible economic choices involving a
woman’s education and career.132  In addition, the lost value of a
woman’s domestic labor fails to translate into the market-based tort
reform formula.133  Therefore, changes in tort law rendering it more
                                                 
produces “gender injustice.”  See id.  This point is illustrated by comparing the products liability
cases involving men and women:
Of the largest product-liability suits of the last 20 years, the one against the makers of
the Vietnam War defoliant Agent Orange, filed primarily on behalf of men, with about
250,000 claimants, is only as large as one of the smallest suits involving women, against
the manufacturers of the Dalkon Shield IUD (intra-uterine device) . . . [The statistics
support the claim that women] ‘have born the brunt of America’s worst product and
medical travesties.’
Id.
128. Koenig & Rustad, supra note 123, at 48.
129. Feminist torts scholar, Professor Lucinda Finley, presents an example of the
undervaluation of women’s reproductive injuries in tort law.  A woman suffered three ectopic
pregnancies, the loss of both of her fallopian tubes, and years of expensive infertility treatment
as a result of exposure to DES.  The jury awarded her $50,000.  After appeal, she settled for
$45,000.  See Lucinda Finley, Feminist Jurisprudence—The 1990 Myra Bradwell Day Panel, 1 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 5, 22 (1991).  Professor Finley personally interviewed the plaintiff, and discussed
this woman’s comments on the nature of the relationship between women and the tort system:
[The Plaintiff] said that the message that she got from society was that the most
important thing about being a woman was her reproductive capacity, and that what
women are really valued for is their reproductive, nurturing role.  And then . . . when
she had the opportunity to make the legal system ‘put society’s money where its mouth
was,’ they told her that all of that was really worth only $50,000.  Why?  Because she
did not have any lost income . . . .  She did not lose marketplace time, even though her
entire reproductive capacity had been taken from her.
Id. at 22-23.
130. Juries have historically awarded punitive damages to compensate women for
psychological harms suffered as a result of defective IUDs and breast implants, sexual assaults by
health care providers, unnecessary reproductive surgeries, and grossly deficient cosmetic
surgery.  See Finley, supra note 122, at 866.  Professor Finley argues that the effects of tort reform
could have severe effects on women suffering non-pecuniary injuries in the form of
psychological and sexualized harms:  “[A]n examination of the types of injuries for which
punitive damages have been awarded to women in products liability and medical malpractice
cases demonstrates that the [punitive damages] cap would primarily serve to devalue women’s
reproductive and sexual well-being.”  Id.; see also infra notes 143-47 (presenting an example of
the effects of punitive damage awards on a manufacturer’s safety decision regarding the
Copper-7 intrauterine device).
131. See Finley, supra note 122, at 855 (maintaining that women’s reproductive and
emotional harm from medical products has little or no economic value in the marketplace).
Courts often fail to consider the mental health therapy often needed by women who experience
reproductive loss, infertility, sexual harassment, or assault when awarding damages for future
medical expenses.  See id. at 857-58.  As these harms often derive from the emotional rather
than the physical realm, courts often overlook them.  See id.
132. The adverse effects that these types of injuries have on a woman’s earning potential
can manifest in a slow accretion “from the way a woman shrinks back or fails to seek certain
assignments or a slow accumulation of too many stress induced absences.”  See id. at 858.
133. See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence:  Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 52 (1989) (contending that most torts text books fail to address issues
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difficult to establish liability will disparately impact women.
The discourse involving the adverse relationship between the goals
of tort reform and the needs of women bleeds into a discussion of the
Restatement (Third) and its impact on women.  Specifically, as greater
consumers of inadequately tested and monitored prescription
products and medical devices, section 6(c)’s limitations on liability
pose a threat to women.
2. Women, medical products, and the regulatory system
Section 6(c) is an extremely stringent standard for establishing
medical product design defect liability.  The Reporters justify this
standard based on two general arguments:  (1) medical products are
unique in nature as compared to other types of products, therefore
meriting greater protections by the tort system;134 and (2) the
regulatory system will perform adequate testing and monitoring and
thus protect the consumer.135  The subsequent section addresses the
fallacies underlying these arguments.
a. The “special” categorization of medical products
The distinction between medical products and other products is
tenuous.  There are expansive categories of medical products on the
market fulfilling cosmetic or “pleasure” purposes.136  Furthermore, a
number of products serve medical purposes despite the FDA’s
                                                 
concerning the loss of a woman’s household management and child rearing services, as these
types of remedies do not fit within the confines of a market economy).
134. See supra note 73.
135. See supra note 74.
136. In the seminal case of Brown v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of California held
that strict liability under the Restatement (Second) did not apply to prescription drugs.  See 751
P.2d 470, 483 (Cal. 1988).  The court justified its decision by reasoning that a distinction existed
between prescription products and other products.  See id. at 478.  The court differentiated
between products that provide pleasure or make work easier and those medical products that
“may be necessary to alleviate pain and suffering or to sustain life.”  See id.  The reasoning
expressed by the California Supreme Court parallels the Reporters’ rationale behind section
6(c) concerning the special nature of medical products.  See supra note 73 and accompanying
text (noting the Reporters’ argument that medical products differ from other products and as
such merit a more stringent standard of liability).
The line dividing medical products from other products, however, is not as distinct as the
Reporters claim.  There is an entire gray area of cosmetic prescription products designed and
marketed with the purpose of “providing pleasure” rather than alleviating pain.  See Terrie
Bialostok Brodie, Brown v. Superior Court:  Drug Manufacturers Get Immunized From Strict Liability
for Design Defects, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 435, 443 (1989) (contending that Brown’s
distinction between prescription drugs and other products is artificial because medical products
exist that can be characterized as “providing pleasure” thus blurring the line between
prescription products and other types of products); see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Sharing
Accountability for Breast Implants:  Strict Products Liability and Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid
Sales/Service Cosmetic Product Transactions, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 873, 874-75 (1994) (addressing
the increased use of implants for cosmetic purposes).
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characterization to the contrary.137
The special categorization of medical products may preclude the
development of safer, more effectively designed medical products
and the removal of harmful medical products from the market.  Even
if a medical product benefits one subclass, a redesigned product may
prove more useful to a larger group.138
Furthermore, the threat of liability creates the incentive for drug
manufacturers to remove less effective and potentially unsafe
products from the market.139  For example, in Kociemba v. G.D. Searle
& Co.,140 the jury awarded $7 million in punitive damages against the
manufacturers of the Copper-7 intra-uterine device (“IUD”) after the
plaintiff established that the device caused her infertility.141  The
                                                 
137. For example, the FDA classifies newly developed vaginal moisturizing products under
the heading of “cosmetics” and not “drugs.”  See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 308.
The FDA distinguishes between cosmetics and drugs.  See Jacqueline A. Greff, Regulation of
Cosmetics That Are Also Drugs, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 243, 243 (1996).  Unlike drugs, the FDA does
not subject cosmetics to pre-market approval, safety or efficacy testing, or good manufacturing
practices.  See id.  Of all the major FDA-regulated products, cosmetics are the only group
without their own FDA center.  See id.  The FDA has classified some products, however, as
“cosmetic drugs,” defined as products “typically . . . formulated and marketed as cosmetics, with
drug functions providing an additional benefit.”  See id. at 249-50.  These products are subject to
both cosmetic and drug regulations.  See id. at 250.  It is unclear under the Restatement (Third)
whether “cosmetic drugs” would fall under Section 6(c), as the text and comment only provide
for liability for “defective prescription drugs and medical devices.”  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 6, § 6.  Standards of liability for defective medical products may produce
incongruous results under the Restatement (Third) depending on how a product is classified.  For
example, the FDA classifies vaginal products with similar purposes differently:
Astringent products intended and labeled for the relief of minor vaginal irritation or
reduction in local edema would be considered as drugs, while astringent products
intended and labeled for a refreshing effect would be considered cosmetics.  A
product making both claims would be both a drug and a cosmetic.
Vaginal Products for Over-the-Counter-Human Use; Withdrawal of Advance Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 59 Fed. Reg. 5226, 5231 (1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 351).
Therefore, under the Restatement (Third), a manufacturer’s liability for harm suffered upon
use of a vaginal product would vary depending on the product’s classification.  If the product’s
classification was “cosmetic,” it would face a more lenient standard of liability under section
2(b), whereas if the product was considered a “drug” (or possibly a “cosmetic drug”), a plaintiff
would have a more difficult time establishing liability under Section 6(c)’s more demanding
standard.
138. See Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 129, 156 (1996) (“[B]y using a reasonable alternative design approach—which is curiously
rejected here—a product that is useful to a subclass of patients may be of even greater use to
that class if redesigned.”).
139. If manufacturers believe they can avoid liability under section 6(c), the incentive to
design the best product is eliminated:
[T]he tort system, with its threat of large demand awards, supplies incentives to
comply with the federal safety requirements.  Indeed, since tort damages can dwarf
monetary penalties under regulatory statutes, the tort system can serve as a greater
deterrent to unsafe practices than the regulatory system itself.
Schwartz, Prescription Products, supra note 7, at 1385.
140. 707 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Minn. 1989).
141. See id. at 1523-24.  The plaintiff won on negligent failure to warn, failure to test, and
product misrepresentation claims.  See id. at 1524.
1999] SEX, DRUGS, AND THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 1165
Kociemba verdict led to thousands of out-of-court settlements142 and
the removal of the Copper-7 IUD from the market.143  Cases involving
the Dalkon Shield144 and Parlodel145 further exemplify how the mere
threat of liability is often a strong enough weapon to protect women
from defective products.
b. The “protective” regulatory system
The FDA has received criticism that its drug approval and
monitoring process is overly thorough.146  Research reveals, however,
that this charge is relatively unfounded.  Rather, various political and
institutional factors within the FDA combine to raise questions
concerning consumer safety.
As a governmental body, the FDA is vulnerable to influence from
                                                 
142. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 123, at 41 (noting that the defendant in Kociemba was
subject to only one punitive damage verdict involving the IUD, but that the large amount of
damages coupled with the threat of future awards prompted the company to settle and not to
litigate any further claims).
143. See Finley, supra note 122, at 875 (discussing the congressional testimony of the
Copper-7 IUD’s attorney, and stating that the first punitive damages award, combined with the
subsequent loss of insurance coverage, “led to the demise of this IUD”).  The IUD
manufacturers in the United States now encounter few lawsuits because of the safety lessons
they learned from the past.  See id. at 874.  Often the threat of litigation is a more effective
means of removing dangerous products from the market than complaints of death and injury:
“The overall irony of the argument that litigation costs drove some IUDs off the market is that
‘reports of injuries and deaths of women, which came years before the devices were withdrawn,
never had that effect.’” Id. (citing NICOLE GRANT, THE SELLING OF CONTRACEPTION:  THE
DALKON SHIELD CASE, SEXUALITY AND WOMEN’S AUTONOMY 147 (1992)).
144. See Finley, supra note 122, at 874.  Professor Finley notes that before punitive damages
in excess of one million dollars were assessed against A.H. Robins, the company was not
inclined to remove the Dalkon Shield from the market:
A.H. Robins continued to market the Dalkon Shield IUD despite mounting reports of
pelvic inflammatory disease, perforated uteruses, infertility, septic abortions, and
internal corporate reports acknowledging that the infection causing propensity could
be greatly reduced for a cost of a few cents per device.  Indeed until juries started
awarding large punitive damages judgments in Dalkon Shield litigation, A.H. Robins
continued to market, promote, and defend the device.
Id.
145. For five years, the FDA requested the manufacturer, Sandoz, to cease marketing
Parlodel as a lactation suppressant drug as the drug was linked to strokes, seizures, and heart
attacks in women.  See Rick Weis, Drug Will No Longer Be Sold to Stop Breast Milk, WASH. POST,
Aug. 23, 1994, at Z7.  Despite FDA pressure, the threat of a lawsuit was the impetus behind the
drug’s removal from the market as a lactation suppressant drug.  See id.; see also infra, notes 174-
76 and accompanying text.
146. Many commentators have written on the issue of the FDA and its role in the tort
system.  See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality:  The Respective
Roles of Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 163, 164 (1998) (discussing current FDA
reform proposals that focus less on consumer protection and more on accelerating drug
approval rates); see also Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription
Drugs and Medical Devices:  Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
883, 886-87 (1996) (discussing the “conservative” nature of the FDA’s regulatory approach and
determining that “[t]he price of this thorough and detailed pre-market review is a long, and
often extremely costly, gestation period between development and approval of new drugs and
devices”).
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powerful political and industrial groups.147  The FDA is also
susceptible to regulatory lag, as slowly changing agency approval
standards clash with fast-moving medical technology.148  Furthermore,
increased responsibility and decreased resources suggest that the
FDA will be unable to ensure safety.149  A 1991 comprehensive study of
the FDA’s resources revealed that the FDA was able to monitor a
smaller share of prescription products than ten years prior.150  Finally,
the FDA has failed to adequately regulate due to manufacturer
fraud151 and “regulatory laxness.”152
                                                 
147. See Margaret Gilhooey, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Compliance and
Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1489 (1994) (arguing that agencies often rely on
industries for information, resulting in the “capture” of agencies by industries which ultimately
produces regulation based on industry influence); see also Teresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory
Standards and Products Liability:  Striking the Right Balance Between the Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 431, 445 (1997) (addressing the regulatory agency’s dependency on the drug industry
for information about a product and the consequent influence the drug industry has on a
product’s approval).  The Reagan Administration’s relationship with the FDA exemplifies the
FDA’s vulnerability to political pressure:
The overall philosophical bent of [President Ronald Reagan’s] administration was
anti-regulatory.  It was reflected almost immediately in FDA actions.  Pending
regulations were withdrawn or postponed.  FDA’s use of its enforcement authority to
ban or to recall products fell sharply, and criminal prosecution of cases was anemic.
In the first five years of the Reagan administration, the FDA staff was cut by more than
12%.  Industry influence on the regulatory process grew enormously, with industry
members enjoying special access to decision makers . . . who in turn influenced agency
action.  Numerous examples of FDA decisions not to regulate, to delay regulations, or
not to bring enforcement actions were traced to pressure from industry members on
political officials at the Department of Health and Human Resources or Office of
Management and Budget.
Schwartz, Prescription Products, supra note 7, at 1389-90; see also Schwartz, supra, at 448 (“[T]he
regulatory environment shifts with the political environment.  Such shifts should raise serious
concerns for the judiciary about relying on the regulatory system to set the safety standards for
the tort system.”).
148. See Schwartz, supra note 147, at 444-45 (arguing that government standards are not
completely reliable as accurate measures of safety because agencies are often unable to keep
pace with the speed of technology).
149. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1387-89 (discussing the impact of the simultaneous
expansion of FDA jurisdiction to regulate over 8,000 drugs and 16,000 medical devices and the
reduction of funding for retaining scientists and maintaining laboratories and equipment).
150. See Schwartz, supra note 147, at 446.
151. In 1993, a manufacturer of defective heart catheters, responsible for one death and 20
emergency surgeries, admitted lying to the FDA concerning the device’s experimental use on
humans and concealing the product’s failures from the FDA.  See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1391
& n.217 (citing Philip J. Hilts, Manufacturer Admits Selling Untested Devices for Heart, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1993, at A1).
152. The FDA received complaints about silicone breast implants for 20 years while attempts
to classify breast implants as “high risk devices” began in 1982 and were not complete until
1992.  See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1394.  The results of a Government Accounting Office study
reveals that between 1976 and 1985, over 50% of FDA approved drugs produced “serious post-
approval risks leading to hospitalization or worse,” many instances of which the FDA had
knowledge but failed to act.  See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 123, at 50.
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c. Asking the question:  drug testing and monitoring for women
In addition to the general problems concerning drug testing and
monitoring, the FDA has a particular problem with inadequate drug
testing and monitoring of products for women.  Justifying the
stringent standard of liability, the Reporters assumed that
“governmental regulatory agencies adequately review new
prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous
designs off the market.”153  The Reporters further contend that the
FDA’s “long, drawn out meticulous [approval] process” is an
appropriate substitute for “judicial decision-making.”154  Research
reveals, however, that this “long, drawn out meticulous [approval]
process,” has traditionally not included women.  Thus, the FDA is not
“an appropriate substitute” for judicial decision making.
Clinical drug trials have systematically excluded women.  Male
subjects have been the prototypes for medical products designed for
the general population, under the rationale that men and women will
experience similar drug reactions.155  Furthermore, drug trials have
tested women’s products using only male subjects.156  The medical
community has criticized this practice,157 arguing that the
complexities of female biology,158 the economic cost of providing for
                                                 
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 6 cmt. b.
154. Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 491-92.
155. See Bowles, supra note 10, at 878 (noting that researchers reason that the effects of
drugs on men are applicable to women).  For example, researchers conducted a study on the
prophylactic benefits of aspirin for the general public using only male models because the
effects were thought to be the same for women.  See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
American Med. Ass’n, Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559, 559 (1991)
[hereinafter Gender Disparities].  The FDA announced that it had doubts about the applicability
of the study’s results to women.  See Guideline for the Evaluation of Gender Differences in the
Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,406 (1993) (“Certain major studies of the role of
aspirin in cardiovascular and cerebrovascular disease, for example, did not include women, and
this omission left the scientific community with doubts about whether aspirin was, in fact,
effective in women for these indications.”).
156. For example, a report by the Task Force on Women’s Health Issues revealed that men
were the only test subjects in a project examining the impact of obesity on breast and uterine
cancer under the rationale that estrogen metabolism in men and women are similar.  See Karen
H. Rotenberg, Gender Matters:  Implications for Clinical Research and Women’s Health Care, 32 HOUS.
L. REV. 1201, 1208 & n.28 (1996).
157. See Bowles, supra note 10, at 880 (noting the criticisms of the claim that women and
men experience similar drug reactions as justification for excluding women from clinical drug
trials).
158. These “complexities” include factoring the female menstrual cycle, pregnancy, and
menopause into drug trials.  See id. at 881-82; see also R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us To Death:
Women, Pregnancy, & Clinical Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 135, 141 (1993).  The author
observed the inherent contradictions in the justifications put forth by the medical
establishment for excluding women from medical drug trials:
There are two assumptions [that are contradictory] . . . .  The first is the idea that men
are typical of all humans . . . .  According to this logic, if an aspirin a day can prevent
heart attacks in men, it will surely do so in women . . . .  The second assumption
contradicts the first.  It is the idea that women are so different from men that their
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these biological variables,159 and the liability risk of teratogenic
effects160 are the actual reasons for women’s exclusion from drug
trials.
In 1977 the FDA issued “General Considerations for the Clinical
Evaluation of Drugs”161 (the “1977 Guidelines”).  These policies
advocated162 the exclusion of women of childbearing potential163 from
clinical drug trials.164  The rationale behind the exclusion of women
                                                 
inclusion would destroy both the homogeneity of the experimental population and
the purity and simplicity of the experiment.
Id. (citing Joan W. Scott, How Did the Male Become the Normative Standard for Clinical Drug Trials?,
48 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 187, 188 (1993)).
159. See Bowles, supra note 10, at 881-82 (noting that the “complex” and “expensive” nature
of drug research is a rationale offered by researchers to justify the exclusion of women from
drug studies).  The economic considerations involved in excluding women from drug research
extends into the realm of grant funding.  The small number of female researchers in positions
of power may be the cause of the low economic prioritization of women’s health research.  See
id. at 883 (noting how the selection process for research funding by the National Institute of
Health is “skewed to the detriment of women” because the few female medical researchers
submitting proposals are “in the lower eschelons of the research hierarchy and thus have less
extensive track records than most of their male counterparts”).
Despite the dearth of funding for projects concerning women’s health, collective efforts by
female researchers are necessary to ensure the safety and progress of medical products for
women.  For example, the drug Thalidomide was developed by a German company as a
tranquilizer for pregnant women, among other uses.  See ANALYZING GENDER:  A HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 444 (Beth B. Hess & Myra Marx Ferree, eds. 1987).  One female
researcher in charge of the approval process of Thalidomide, Dr. Frances Kelsey, was
responsible for exposing the drugs’ harmful effect on pregnant women.  See id. at 445.  Despite
heavy pressure from drug companies and the worldwide acceptance of Thalidomide, Dr. Kelsey
refused to permit companies to openly market the drug.  See id.  It is estimated that
Thalidomide was responsible for producing at least 10,000 deformed babies.  See id.  Dr. Kelsey
eventually received a presidential citation for her efforts concerning Thalidomide.  See id.
160. See Bowles, supra note 10, at 880 (“[P]harmaceutical houses fear liability for injuries to
a woman or her fetus that might occur in a clinical trial.”).
161. FDA, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 77-3040, GENERAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF DRUGS (1977) [hereinafter 1977
GUIDELINES].
162. The Guidelines are not necessarily requirements for drug approval.  The Foreword to
the Guidelines states:
These guidelines are not to be interpreted as mandatory requirements by the FDA to
allow continuation of clinical trials with investigational drugs or obtain approval of a
new drug for marketing. . . .  [They] contain recommendations for clinical studies
which are recognized as desirable approaches to be used in arriving at conclusions
concerning safety and effectiveness of new drugs; . . . they consist of the views of
outstanding experts in the field as to what constitutes appropriate methods of study of
specific classes of drugs.
Id. at 5.
163. “A woman of childbearing potential is defined as a premenopausal female capable of
becoming pregnant.  This includes women on oral, injectable, or mechanical contraception;
women who are single; women whose husbands have been vasectomized or whose husbands
have received or are utilizing mechanical contraceptive devices.”  Id. at 15.
164. See id.  The 1977 Guidelines recommend excluding women from the earliest dose
ranging studies.  See id.  The Guidelines advocate that before studies include women of
childbearing potential in large-scale clinical trials, adequate safety and efficacy studies,
including animal reproduction studies, must be performed.  See id.  The 1977 Guidelines
provide for women of childbearing potential to receive investigational drugs without the
performance of adequate animal reproduction studies for drugs used as a life-saving or life-
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of childbearing potential was to avoid possible teratogenic effects.
The 1977 Guidelines, however, recognized the possibility of genetic
harm to males from experimental drugs.  Yet the Guidelines failed to
impose such restrictive testing policies on male subjects.165  These
policies have resulted in a pervasive lack of drug testing on fertile
women.166
In 1993, the FDA revised the section of its Exclusionary Guidelines
entitled, “Women of Childbearing Potential,” to include fertile
women in these trials.167  The FDA admitted that its 1977 policy all but
excluded women from phase 1, non-therapeutic studies, and the
earliest controlled effectiveness studies.168  The FDA further conceded
                                                 
prolonging measure or drugs which teratogenic potential has been established in animals.  See
id.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), four years prior to the
issuance of the Guidelines, may have influenced the FDA’s concern for fetal protection.  See
Charo, supra note 158, at 139.
165. The 1977 Guidelines provide:
Male Reproductive System:
Where testicular abnormalities of spermatogenesis have occurred in experimental
animals or where chromosomal abnormalities are anticipated . . . the criteria for
inclusion of males in Phases I, II, and III depend upon the nature of the
abnormalities, the dosage at which they occurred, the disease being treated, the
importance of the drug, and the duration of the drug administration.  In some cases,
special written consent forms, even in Phase III, may be required.
1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 161, at 16.
166. See Charo, supra note 158, at 145 (“The result [of these testing policies] is to make all
women who use these drugs into unwitting, unconsenting post-marketing research subjects,
because the damage caused by untested drugs could be equally or more harmful to the general
population of fertile women than to fertile participants in the trials.”).
167. The FDA announced that it would require fertile women in these studies to undergo
pregnancy screens and counseling on the importance of using birth control devices while
participating in the trials.  See Guideline for the Evaluation of Gender Differences in the
Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,406, 39,408 (1993).
168. See id.  Phase 1 drug studies generally lack therapeutic intent, the exception being early
studies of life-threatening diseases.  See id. at 39,407.  Phase 1 studies include the testing of a
new drug on normally healthy humans to examine the drug’s tolerability, metabolism, and
short-term pharmacokinetics.  See id.  Phase 2 drug studies begin from the premise that the
drug lacks therapeutic value in humans.  See id.  These studies include the initial controlled
effectiveness study of a particular drug.  See id.  The 1977 Guidelines permitted the inclusion of
fertile women in later phase 2 and 3 studies if the phase 1 and 2 trials had amassed adequate
drug safety and effectiveness information and had completed studies involving animal
teratogenicity and female part of animal fertility.  See id. at 39,407-08.  Apparently, the 1977
Guidelines failed to address the means by which researchers could utilize the effectiveness
information and animal studies to determine whether a phase 2 or 3 study merited the
inclusion of fertile women.  See Charo, supra note 158, at 139 n.23.  The determination was
therefore left to the patient and physician to perform a risk-benefit assessment subject to FDA
review.  See id.
The result of the exclusion policy regarding fertile women and early drug trials is that women
subsequently are excluded from later trials, despite the FDA’s revised policies.  See id. at 143
(“Unfortunately, streamlining early drug studies by excluding women tends to make the
exclusion of women attractive in later phases as well.”).  The FDA confessed that its studies have
neglected women such that “there has been little study of the effects of such aspects of female
physiology as the menstrual cycle and menopause, or of the effects of drugs widely used in
women such as oral contraceptives and systemic progestins and estrogens, on drug action and
pharmacokinetics.”  Guideline for the Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical
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that its policies fostered a male-oriented drug research scheme:  “The
early exclusion also may have perpetuated . . . a view of the male as
the primary focus of medicine and drug development, with women
considered secondarily.”169  This revised drug testing policy fails to
absolve the FDA, however, because it does not require companies to
include women in trials as a quid pro quo for drug approval.170
Therefore, regardless of the new FDA policy, drug trials may still
exclude women based on their absence from earlier trials and/or the
lack of an official mandate to include them.
Compounding its pre-approval deficiencies, the FDA’s post-
approval track record for protecting women from harmful products is
equally poor.  Women who have suffered strokes and seizures from
the drug Parlodel,171 or ruptured silicone breast implants,172 are not
likely to be comforted by the fact that a product bears the FDA’s
stamp of approval.  Although medical devices are subject to FDA
monitoring, the FDA may require mounting complaints of injury and
death before it removes these products from the market.173  For
example, the FDA withdrew the lactation-suppressant drug Parlodel
from the market only after amassing reports that the drug caused
thirty-one strokes (nine of which were fatal), sixty-three seizures, and
seven heart attacks (one of which was fatal).174  Furthermore, the
impetus to remove Parlodel from the market did not originate within
the FDA, but rather from a consumer group’s suit against the FDA
                                                 
Evaluation of Drugs, 58 Fed. Reg. at 39,406.
169. Guideline for the Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs,
58 Fed. Reg. at 39,408.  The FDA additionally admitted that this discrimination may have
affected medical dosing recommendations for women:  “[T]here is reason to believe that
earlier participation of women in studies would increase the likelihood that gender-specific data
might be used to make appropriate adjustments in larger clinical studies (e.g., different doses
in women or weight adjusted (milligram per kilogram) dosing instead of fixed doses).”  Id.; see
also Rotenberg, supra note 156, at 1206 (discussing the scientific community’s prevalent
perception of the male as the physical norm and consequent characterization of the female’s
differences as “unknown variables”).
170. See Guideline for the Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of
Drugs, 58 Fed. Reg. at 39,408-09.  The FDA’s 1993 Guidelines state:
We do not at this time perceive a regulatory basis for requiring routinely that women
in general or women of childbearing potential be included in particular trials, such as
phase 1 studies . . . .  The agency is confident that the interplay of ethical, social,
medical, legal and political forces will allow greater participation of women in the
early stages of clinical trials.
Id.
171. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 152 (discussing the FDA’s slow response to women’s complaints
concerning defective breast implants).
173. See Finley, supra note 122, at 874.
174. See Edward R. Silverman, Novartis Pays $20 Million to Settle Suit, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), June 11, 1997, at 49  (discussing the decision by Novartis Ltd., manufacturer of Parlodel,
to settle a lawsuit alleging that Parlodel rendered a 24-year old woman brain damaged).
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aimed at forcing restriction of the drug’s use.175
Asking the Woman Question of section 6(c) engenders an
unfavorable response.  Medical products, like other products, have an
alarming capacity for harm, yet face the most rigid standard of
liability in the Restatement (Third).  Furthermore, the FDA cannot
adequately ensure the safety of medical products for women.
Therefore, concepts of fairness and safety demand an exception to
this stringent liability standard for harmful medical products falling
short of section 6(c)’s standard.
III.  RECOMMENDATION:  THE ANSWER TO THE WOMAN QUESTION:
COMMENT E SHOULD APPLY TO SECTION 6(C)
Comment e was designed as an exception to the design defect
liability standard in section 2(b) requiring proof of a reasonable
alternative design.176  Comment e is the only provision in the
Restatement (Third) that protects society from defectively designed
products without requiring proof of either a reasonable alternative
design, as in section 2(b),177 or the product’s complete inefficacy, as
in section 6(c).178
This Comment advocates that comment e should apply to section
6(c).  The Reporters specifically note, however, that section 2(b) does
not apply to prescription drugs and medical devices.179  Therefore,
the question becomes whether comment e of section 2(b) can and
should apply to section 6(c).
A. Was Comment e Designed to Apply to Section 6(c)?
Comment e and section 6(c) are different variations of the same
principle.  Under comment e, a product is defectively designed
precisely because it performed as intended.180  Proof of a reasonable
                                                 
175. See Weis, supra note 145, at Z7.  Five years before the FDA withdrew its approval for
Parlodel, the agency merely encouraged the manufacturer to withdraw the drug; however, after
Public Citizen filed a lawsuit against the FDA, the agency filed a notice in the Federal Register
formally withdrawing approval for Parlodel.  One day later, the manufacturer of Parlodel
determined it would remove lactation suppression from the drug’s labeling.  See id.
176. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b) cmt. e.
177. See id. § 2(b).
178. See id. § 6(c).
179. See id. § 6 cmt. b (“2(b) . . . does not apply to prescription drugs and medical devices.”);
see also id. § 6 reporters’ note, cmt. f (“The rule set forth in section 6(c) would provide the
exclusive basis for a cause of action based on objective drug design.”).
180. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing the example of the toy gun in
relation to comment e).  The Reporters created the comment e exception for certain products
with a specific design purpose.  The toy gun example illustrates how the Reporters have not
included comment e to cover malfunctioning products.  Rather, comment e includes only
properly functioning products since an alternative design would create the same social harm as
the original product.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2 cmt. e.
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alternative design is unnecessary because the product’s intended
purpose possesses such low social utility that no alternative design
would be reasonable.181
Under section 6(c), however, inefficacy is the basis of liability.182  If
the medical product is effective for any group, the drug is not
defectively designed.183  For example, in Tobin, evidence indicated
that the drug failed to a provide benefit to any class of persons.184  In
other words, the drug was defectively designed only because it
completely failed.
The concepts behind comment e and section 6(c), therefore, differ
in the Restatement (Third) in their respective characterizations.  That
is, under section 2(b), the comment e risk-benefit exception is
invoked if the product’s purpose lacks social utility.185  In contrast,
section 6(c) focuses on whether the product’s result lacks utility.186  In
sum, comment e applies to products having a base purpose whereas
section 6(c) applies to products producing a base result.
B.  Should Comment e Apply to Section 6(c)?
Although the Reporters may not have designed comment e to
apply to section 6(c), their intentions do not preclude the possibility
that comment e should apply to section 6(c).  Restatements are not
formal pronouncements of law, and thus a court is not required to
adhere strictly to their provisions.187
The Reporters erected a roadblock, however, to keep section 6(c)
claimants from accessing comment e.  Under comment e, the trier of
fact must first pass judgment on the social utility of the product’s
purpose.188  Comment e, therefore, will never technically apply to a
                                                 
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2, cmt. e.
182. See id. § 6(c).
183. See id.
184. See Tobin v. Astra Pharm., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b).
186. See id. § 6(c).
187. The Reporters acknowledge that the purpose of a Restatement is to provide clarity in
the law and not to bind judges and legislatures to every provision in a Restatement.  See James A.
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled Waters:  Reflections, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1262-63 (1993) (noting that “a restatement is . . . not primary authority,”
and that “[c]ourts are free to disagree with restatement positions and do so with considerable
frequency”).
188. The Reporters discuss the example of the toy gun in relation to comment e.  See supra
notes 58-61 and accompanying text.  The Reporters note that the toy gun merits the comment e
exception only if the court first determines that the gun’s purpose is socially unacceptable:
[I]f the realism of the toy pellet gun, and thus its capacity to cause injury, is sufficiently
important to those who purchase and use such products to justify the court’s limiting
consideration to toy guns that achieve realism by shooting hard pellets, then no
reasonable alternative will, by hypothesis, be available.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b) cmt. e.
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medical product claim.  Common sense dictates that no
manufacturer will produce a medical product with an “egregiously
unacceptable” purpose, subsequently gaining FDA approval.189
This roadblock to comment e should be lifted to allow consumers
harmed by defective medical products access to its protections.
Comment e’s purpose is to provide liability in the absence of a
reasonable alternative design to ensure the elimination of products
containing “a low social utility and a very high risk.”190  Comment e,
therefore, serves to protect society from truly dangerous products not
covered by other sections of the Restatement (Third).
By extension, one can argue that defectively designed medical
products are so truly dangerous that claims neglected by section 6(c)
should find protection in comment e.  Notwithstanding a medical
product’s benign purpose, its effect could nonetheless be
“egregiously unacceptable” and have “low social utility and a very
high risk.”191  Furthermore, there may be a subclass of people deriving
small benefit from a drug, while the drug’s overall effect is
damaging.192  Under section 6(c), a consumer has no recourse in
defective design theory.  In addition, a manufacturer would have no
incentive to redesign the product to satisfy both the benefiting
subgroup and also a larger class of users.
In addition, one may argue that the application of comment e to
section 6(c) will be fatal to a subgroup of users for whom a certain
product is the only treatment.  This fear is unfounded.  Comment e’s
risk-benefit test will ensure that genuinely beneficial products remain
on the market.  The fact that a certain product is the exclusive
treatment for a subgroup will weigh heavily in the risk-benefit
analysis.  A blanket standard of liability, lacking a risk-benefit
provision, however, subjects the public to dangerous products with
relatively little means of redress.
Finally, because women are greater consumers of inadequately
tested and monitored medical products, they will be
disproportionately harmed by products having “low social utility and
                                                 
189. Although medical products may cause harm, they are never designed with the purpose of
causing harm.  For example, a drug is not designed and put on the market with the explicit
purpose of causing birth defects or heart problems.  The drug could, however, have such an
effect despite its benign purpose.  Medical products are, therefore, unlike the toy gun example,
as the gun at issue was specifically designed to cause harm, “an egregiously unacceptable
purpose” for a child’s toy.
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2(b) cmt. e.
191. Id.
192. See id. § 6 cmt. b (noting that a drug will not be considered defective as long as it
provides net benefits to some people under some circumstances).  Such an analysis will be
applied irrespective of whether the drug’s overall effect is damaging.  See id.
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very high risk.”  Thus, women need comment e to apply to section
6(c) in order to establish liability and drive harmful products from
the market.
C. Case Law, Comment k, and a Cigar:  Comment e and Section 6(c)
The Ortho Pharmaceutical and Williams decisions provide additional
support for the application of comment e to section 6(c).  These
courts applied a risk-benefit analysis to determine defective design
similar to that found in comment e.193  The Williams and Ortho
Pharmaceutical courts did not base their holdings solely on the
existence of a subgroup deriving benefit from the drug.  Rather, the
courts ultimately decided the issue of design defect by assessing
whether a drug’s overall harm outweighed its benefit.194
This rationale reflects the principle underlying comment e.
Comment e provides an illustration depicting a person (Jack) injured
by an exploding prank cigar.195  Comment e suggests that “the utility
of the exploding cigar is so low and risk of injury is so high as to
warrant a conclusion that the cigar is defective and should not have
been marketed at all.”196  The cigar may not be injurious to people
who find that the benefits from the cigar’s amusement outweigh the
risks.  The degree of harm suffered by those injured, however, may be
higher than the benefit the cigar provides to that subclass of people.
The Ortho Pharmaceutical and Williams courts recognized that the
danger of a defectively designed medical product is comparable to
that of an exploding cigar.  That is, like the test employed in
comment e, these courts determined that an overall risk-benefit
analysis should be conducted to assess whether a drug is defectively
                                                 
193. See id. § 2(b) cmt. e.
194. See Ortho Pharm. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 413-14 (Colo. 1986) (ruling that a risk-benefit
analysis should be employed in assessing whether Ortho-Novum was defectively designed and
rejecting the use of the consumer expectation test); Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp.
573, 580-81 (W.D. La. 1988) (employing a risk-benefit analysis to determine whether Tegretol
was defectively designed).
195. The illustration in comment e reads:
ABC Co. manufacturers novelty items.  One item, an exploding cigar, is made to
explode with a loud bang and the emission of smoke.  Robert purchased the
exploding cigar and presented it to his boss, Jack. . . .  Jack lit the cigar.  When it
exploded, the heat from the explosion lit Jack’s beard on fire causing serious burns to
his face.  If a court were to recognize the rule identified in [comment e], the finder of
fact might find ABC liable for the defective design of the exploding cigar even if no
reasonable alternative design was available that would provide similar prank
characteristics.  The utility of the exploding cigar is so low and the risk of injury is so
high as to warrant a conclusion that the cigar is defective and should not have been
marketed at all.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 2 cmt. e, illus. 5.
196. Id.
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designed.197
Furthermore, invoking the Restatement (Second), courts historically
have recognized the need for individual assessments of a medical
product’s risks and benefits to determine liability.  A majority of
courts have refused to grant blanket comment k immunity to medical
products under the Restatement (Second).  Instead, these courts engage
in a case-by-case determination before applying comment k.198
Contrary to precedent, however, Section 6(c) of the Restatement
(Third) is tantamount to the blanket immunity provision in comment
k, as few claims will meet its difficult standard of liability.199
By extension, courts need the freedom to render individual
assessments before establishing liability under the Restatement (Third).
Comment e is the only place in the Restatement (Third) where a
medical product can receive individual attention.  Thus, comment e
is necessary to protect consumers from products which may not meet
the stringent standard of section 6(c), but nevertheless are
responsible for causing harm, rendering the design “manifestly
unreasonable.”
CONCLUSION:  THE WOMAN QUESTION REVISITED
This Comment asked the Woman Question of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts and received an unsettling response.  Women
consume more medical products than men.  This factor alone
indicates that women will suffer disproportionate harm at the hands
of section 6(c), all products being equal.  All products are not equal,
however, as medical products lack adequate testing and monitoring
for women.  The potential for harm to women is large, while the
reality of successfully winning a design defect claim is small.
In light of this response to the aforeposed Question regarding
medical product liability and women, this Comment proposes that
the incorporation of comment e into section 6(c) is the best answer.
                                                 
197. See supra notes 106-11, 115-18 (discussing the Ortho Pharmaceutical and Williams courts’
determinations that a risk-benefit test is the appropriate form of analysis to be employed in
assessing whether a drug is defectively designed).
198. See supra note 36 (discussing the fact that most courts subject each medical product to
an individualized assessment before applying comment k).  In an article defending the section
6(c) standard, Professor Henderson admits that the current judicial trend is against blanket
comment k immunity.  See Henderson, Reporter’s Perspective, supra note 7, at 475 (observing that
“the trend toward judicial design review of some kind is unmistakable”).
199. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the Reporters’ recognition that
under the 6(c) standard, very few design claims against a prescription product’s manufacturer
will be successful).  See also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1385 (“[Section 6(c)’s] heightened
negligence standard makes it virtually impossible to pursue a successful claim.  The drafters said
that they did not want to eliminate design claims, but it seems that they have, in effect, done
so.”).
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Section 6(c) is a stringent standard imposing severe restrictions on a
woman’s ability to establish liability and ultimately to remove unsafe
products from the market.
The Reporters consider the capacity for harm in a toy gun and a
prank cigar as meriting exception in the Restatement (Third), while
subjecting a medical product with inadequate testing and monitoring
for women to the most stringent standard of liability.  This disparate
level of protection is insulting and unfair to women and violates the
spirit of comment e to keep manifestly unreasonably designed
products from harming society.  As comment e protects Jack when a
prank cigar harms his face,200 so too should comment e protect Jane
when a medical product harms her body.
When this Comment asked the Woman Question of the Restatement
(Third), it was ultimately asking whether the tort system “encourages
behavior that is caring about others’ safety and [is] responsive to
others’ needs or hurts, and that attends to human contexts and
consequences.”201
Without the application of comment e to section 6(c) in the
Restatement (Third), the answer to the Woman Question is simply:  No.
                                                 
200. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text (presenting an illustration of the
comment e standard).
201. Bender, supra note 1, at 31-32.
